The ethnography is the staple of anthropological fieldwork, since it is the distillation of the anthropologist’s experience while carrying out participant observation within a culture. Ever since post-modernism, the value of the ethnography has come into question as an accurate – albeit static –representation of culture. One of the main issues is the question as to whether the anthropologist 1 can ever separate themselves from their own cultural lens enough to truly understand and present another culture from a purely non-ethnocentric point of view. Lambert and Chasteen’s article titled “Social Cognition” – in Bechtel and Graham – refers to social cognition as “a discipline in which researchers seek to understand social phenomena in terms or models which emphasize the role of cognitive processes” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 306). This is an exploration of how social cognition principles may address some of the issues currently surrounding ethnography, and perhaps how they may be of help to ethnographic methodology. While the current issues surrounding ethnography include a rejection of positivism in regards to interpretation of cultural behaviours (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994: 251), I will be concentrating more on issues of objectivity arising from the ethnographer’s existing frameworks for perception of the cultural “other”.
The Ethnography And Why It Is Problematic
Perhaps it is best to start with an operant definition of ethnography. One of the more useful definitions is that ethnography is a description of the “customary social behaviours of an identifiable group of people” (Wolcott 1999: 252). Rather than take a purely positivistic approach to the description, anthropology seeks to document the characteristics and meanings behind these behaviours rather than to set about proving hypotheses about them (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994: 248). This is what makes ethnography so difficult in the sense that the ethnographer – most often an anthropologist – is typically dealing with concepts that are not easily translated across different cultural boundaries, and must therefore be interpreted. It is in this interpretation that ethnography encounters the issues of objectivity. These issues include – but are not limited to – the objectivity of participant observation, and the objectivity of perception of the cultural other in terms of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism.
Participant Observation
As an ethnographer, participant observation is the primary method for data gathering. While in the process of observing, there is always the challenge that the informants may begin to form their own opinions about what it is that the ethnographer requires for their research. As a way of controlling or contributing to how the group is represented, the informants may begin to tailor information with this goal in mind. Therefore, in participant observation, whether it be a tribe on the 15th floor or the 15th parallel, there are typically issues of truth versus expected truth. In other words, the challenge of what we think is reality in terms of what we experience versus what our informants provide to the researcher as an interpretation of what they think the researcher expects or requires from them. In general, this type of problem arises as a result of the way the ethnographer represents himself or his research to the group. When describing one’s research in the field, it is best to be as vague as possible while remaining within ethical boundaries to lessen this issue.
If the informants begin to manage what is observed, then what is observed can become skewed as the data that is provided in terms of spoken-about or observable behaviours begins to get interpreted by the researcher in ways that are no longer objective, and are instead fulfilling some ulterior motive or objective. This ultimately becomes problematic when these non-objective representations portrayed in the ethnography become the de-facto definitions for that group to others.
Objectivity Of Perception
The issues of ethnocentrism – judging a culture and its behaviours through your own cultural lens – and cultural relativism – judging a culture and its behaviours on its own merits – are far reaching in ethnographies. This is a particular challenge to the ethnographer because it calls into question whether we ever really let go of our own frameworks in fieldwork. As Atkinson and Hammerlsey posit, “This is not just a matter of recognition of differences but also the judgement that these differences cannot be properly understood by seeing them in terms of deplorable deviation from the norms of the observer’s here and now or as signs of cultural backwardness” (1994: 249). The ethnographer must become aware of the operant frameworks with which he approaches the interpretation of the cultural other as a way of reconciling the objective truth with subjective interpretations of it. That is not to say that there is no place for subjectivity in the experience. Malinowski’s2 research in the Trobriand Islands was contrasted posthumously by the publishing of his personal diaries at the time (Bernard 2006: 392) in which the former showed a much more objective representation of the culture than the latter. In order to maintain the integrity of the ethnography as social research, there must be clear boundaries set out between personal experience recollection and research experience observation.
A large part of the issue of objectivity of perception has to do with the operant frameworks that the ethnographer takes into the research process. If an ethnographer begins research with social prejudices – whether consciously or subconsciously – it will taint the objectivity of the observations and therefore the research data. It is my hypothesis that a broader awareness and understanding of these frameworks on the part of the ethnographer can provide more objective – and by extension more valuable – accounts of group behaviours when observing the cultural “other”. This awareness can be brought about through an understanding of the components of social cognition.
Social Cognition As A Perspective For Ethnography
Based on the problem stated above, social cognition is a useful tool to engage in a reflexive perspective for ethnography by analyzing how it affects the ethnographer’s ability to be objective about his research subjects. As one of the primary concerns for the objectivity of the ethnographer is prejudice, it may be helpful to look at prejudice as a form of stereotyping. The cognitive approach to stereotyping is defined as a “part of a larger intrinsic need to reduce the overwhelming complexity of the social environment” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 307). An ethnographer will typically find himself in sensory-rich environments – especially at the beginning of fieldwork – in which the sensory and cognitive overload may be overwhelming. As a result, the brain may well resort to stereotypes as a coping mechanism to simplify the inputs in cognition.
Lambert and Chasteen note that, “the kinds of categorical representations that people form can be quite different, depending on the nature of the perceiver’s underlying goals and motivation” (1999: 307). Thus, it is possible that an ethnographer will form categorical representations because he is looking for certain things and working with familiar frameworks. This may give rise to erroneous translations of behaviours into these familiar frameworks as the ethnographer attempts to make the culture fit their categories rather than the other way around. The issue of translation is problematic because of the fact that the frameworks may not exist in one or neither culture to create an equivalency as a method of understanding.
The issue of prejudice is not limited to the ethnographer’s prejudices as shaped by previous experiences. There is also the issue of ingroup and outgroup membership. In the case of social research, “the perceiver’s own category membership and its relation to that of the person being judged is critical” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 309). Therefore, ingroup and outgroup perception may actually change how the ethnographer builds social categories, and in doing so, may actually change the functional/structural perception of the social group being studied. According to Henri Tajfel, “people show greater favouritism to the members of ingroups as apposed to outgroups” (1999: 309). The situation is further complicated since the ethnographer is typically marginalized – especially in the beginning – and therefore likely a member of one of the outgroups for a large part of the research. Admittedly, this dichotomy between ethnographer and cultural “other” exists primarily as a construct, and it has been said that anthropologists – including ethnographers – would do well to rethink the “subject and object of research as cosubjects” (Pollock 2006: 326), thus lessening the impact of the mental hurdle of at least thinking of oneself as an outsider as a way of ensuring objectivity. There is also the phenomenon of the outgroup homogeneity effect, in which “people perceive a greater variability amongst ingroups than outgroups” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 309). As a result, there is always a danger of oversimplifying social behaviour as a result of the ethnographer’s outgroup membership status. Improved knowledge of ingroups prior to field research should enrich the understanding of socio-cultural structures and functions while in fieldwork, but this kind of knowledge depends largely on how much research is already available. In any case, it would serve any ethnography well to reserve final analysis based on ingroup/outgroup perceptions to a point at which there is a clearer understanding of the group’s structure. As an accepted practice, it is not really until the end of field research an ethnographer will typically take all his field notes and begin a process of interpretation of the data and validation against previous research and theories about social behaviour amongst the group specifically studied, or groups similar to it. But even at this point, stereotypes or prejudices can persist.
Cultural Accessibility
In addition to the issue of ingroup/outgroup perceptions, there is also the issue of cultural accessibility. Cultural accessibility can be tied to the ethnographer’s ability to engage in cultural relativism vis-à-vis his ability to build operant frameworks of meaning through meaningful access to the culture. Although there are issues at play in terms of gender, age, status, and emic/etic3 perceptions, there are different ways in which to interpret cultures by accessing and successfully interpreting the frameworks of informants. The ability to accurately interpret the frameworks is crucial to filling in the gaps left by lack of accessibility to situations, and this interpretation can be better understood perhaps by understanding cognitive responses to stimuli and how they relate to interpretations. Lambert and Chasteen assert that, “ people construe the meaning of a stimulus by first accessing some kind of internal representation that matches the properties of the presented stimulus” (1999: 309).
Therefore, if the initial assignment of meaning is done on a first-match basis, then it becomes important to ensure that the ethnographer creates stronger associations with the more global aspects of a culture as quickly as possible since fieldwork begins so as to avoid tainting the research data with erroneous assumptions that are propagated forward based on these first-match assumptions. In regards to this seemingly instinctual response to stimuli, William Redmond states, “the preprogrammed response can be muted or overridden by cognition” (Redmond 2006: 436). Therefore, the fact that the ethnographer becomes aware of their propensity to react instinctively in a certain way, over time can allow him to adapt to the new stimulus and respond in a way that is more appropriate to the context in which the stimulus is being experienced – observing participant behaviour. This is arguably the cognitive shift from ethnocentrism to cultural relativism.
This adaptation to stimuli could be looked at in terms of the assimilation effect, in which “increasing the accessibility to a particular concept made it more likely that subsequently presented information would be interpreted in terms of that primed concept” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 310). The assimilation effect is a useful definition for the end product of adaptation to the new stimuli in observation, but how do we get to the point at which we make the adaptation? The catalyst to this process could very well be the contrast effect, with the effect described as: “making a trait concept more accessible leads people to judge stimuli in ways opposite to their implications of the activated concept” (1999: 310). These two effects essentially work together to expand and maintain these cognitive cultural frameworks. The important thing being that the ethnographer must make himself aware of the fact that these challenges to perceptual frameworks as it pertains to the perceiving of meaning in observed behaviours are going to happen. Otherwise, this process may easily be chalked up to anxiety, and reverting to previous stereotypes or prejudices for interpretations may provide an easy way out.
It should be noted that these relapses into stereotypes or prejudices when interpreting cultural behaviours can be useful as a learning tool, as long as they are part of the ethnographer’s documented experiences while doing fieldwork. Especially since the ethnographer may not have an immediate frame of reference with a cultural group in cases in which the research about the cultural group is grossly outdated or non-existent. In these cases, the ethnographer may choose to use dispositional attributions – ones that speak more to a group or individual’s disposition in a more general sense rather than in certain situations (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 311). The authors assert that dispositional attributions are “more informative and useful than situational attributions” (1999: 311). Documentation of such experiences can be very helpful to the ethnographer in terms of learning more about his own process of framework expansion, moving from the more general to the more specific as he learns the contextual meanings for different observed behaviours. Thus, when used as a tool in situ, not only can it ease the transition into more culturally relativistic frameworks, but it can also help with behavioural adaptations that facilitate social transactions with individuals and groups, thus moving the ethnographer in from the periphery and closer to understanding the subtleties of ingroup/outgroup behaviours. This kind of reflexivity is useful for ethnographers as a way of keeping themselves in check during fieldwork. Glenda Raven describes reflexivity as “a critical exploration of not only what we know, but also more centrally, what we do not know (i.e., our unawareness) and why and how we have come to know or not to know” (Raven 2006: 560). Through cognition, our awareness of the gaps in our perceptual frameworks allow for us to recognize opportunities to expand them.
The recognition of these opportunities plays into motivations for better ethnographies through the acquiring of more objective observational data. In this way, “personal attitudes play a role in controlled processes after initial activation of the stereotype, in which people may connect for its influence, provided that they are motivated and have the resources to do so” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 311). I would argue that the motivation comes out of a desire to produce better ethnographies, and the resources to do so come out of engaged cognition about the processes of stereotypes, assimilation and contrast effects, and the building and expanding of categories and frameworks.
Next Steps?
I would say that this concept definitely warrants more research into bridging social cognition to anthropological data gathering and interpretation. Through a better understanding of social cognition, anthropology would be better equipped to bridge the gaps of perception that are typically faced by ethnographers when studying a culture whose customs and beliefs may be far outside of their experience. Thus, the principles of social cognition can be applied as a way of better informing ethnographers of their limitations and points of view, and in doing so, allowing them to sidestep or lessen the impacts of cultural biases when doing ethnographic research.
While writing this article I have developed a couple of exercises that could be put into effect to engage the ethnographer in some of the principles of social cognition prior to fieldwork. I will briefly explain the “draft impressions”, and “stereotype matching” exercises.
“Draft impressions” is an exercise that is meant to engage the contrast effect. This exercise should be done prior to beginning initial research and after initial research is completed prior to going into fieldwork. In the first pass through the exercise, the ethnographer will write down impressions that they may have about the cultural group and geographical location where the group is situated. The point of this exercise is to generate an awareness of the changes in perception as a result of increased knowledge from research, especially when the pre-research and post-research impression drafts are compared. This will also get the ethnographer accustomed to the process of changing or building perceptual frameworks and help him manage this change. In fact, it may be useful to generate a third set of draft impressions shortly upon arriving at the fieldwork site as a way of noting the changes, and making oneself aware of these changes to the perceptual frameworks in situ.
The “Stereotype Matching” exercise is done after the pre-fieldwork research is done. It is meant to engage Gordon Allport’s cognitive approach to stereotyping (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 308) by having the ethnographer draw up a list of adjectives – both qualitative and quantitative – describing the cultural group and geographical location where the fieldwork will take place. Once done, the next part of the exercise entails going through each of the adjectives, and writing down any experiences that the ethnographer may have had with those adjectives – either in their own geo-cultural context or abroad. E.g. recalling a previous experience with a tropical environment. This will allow the ethnographer to identify elements that carry similar adjective characteristics to ones in prior experience, and thus identify potentially existing stereotypes and/or prejudices that may taint observational data or generate anxiety if they go unnoticed.
A Very Brief Conclusion
Social cognition is referred to as “a particular approach to studying human behaviour and cognition” (Lambert & Chasteen 1999: 312), which makes it a good fit with anthropology and ethnography since they both work from very similar mandates. As a result, social cognition is very useful as an introspective tool for the ethnographer as they expand their own frameworks and build news ones in their introduction to and subsequent study of new cultures and/or cultural elements and situations.
Notes
1 The term anthropologist and ethnographer will be synonymous in the context of this article.
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2 Bronislaw Malinowski is often seen as one of the founders of the ethnography in anthropology.
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3 Emic is typically in reference to things within a culture, while etic is typically in reference to things outside of a culture.
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References
Atkinson, Paul and Martyn Hammersley. 1994. “Ethnography and Participant Observation.” Pp. 248-261 in Handbook of Qualitative Research”Ethnography and Participant Observation.” Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Bernard, H. R. 2006. Research methods in anthropology : qualitative and quantitativeapproaches. 4th ed. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Lambert, Alan J and Chasteen, Alison L. (1999). “Social Cognition” in Bechtel, William and Grahram, George (1999), “A Companion To Cognitive Science”. Blackwell Publishing. Malden, MA.
Pollock, Della(2006)’Marking New Directions in Performance Ethnography’,Text andPerformance Quarterly,26:4,325 – 329.
Raven, Glenda(2006)’Methodological reflexivity: towards evolving methodologicalframeworks through critical and reflexive deliberations’, Environmental EducationResearch,12:3,559 – 569.
Redmond, William H. 2006. “Instinct, Culture, and Cognitive Science.” Journal of Economic Issues 40(2):431-438.
Snow, David A., Calvin Morrill and Leon Anderson. 2003. “Elaborating Analytic Ethnography: Linking Fieldwork and Theory.” Ethnography 4(2):181-200.
Wolcott, Harry F. 1999. Ethnography : a way of seeing. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
